When I started Reality Fusion a colleague from Borland named Song Huang came to the garage for a demo. I showed him our super-cool video interaction software. He was impressed. Then, we sat down outside and talked about the business plan. Song was vibrant, practical, hard working and experienced. I wanted to hire him as VP of marketing. Everything was going along great until he asked me about the "exit strategy" for the company. I was totally confused. Exit strategy? Talk about putting the cart before the horse! The ladder to the 2nd floor office was falling apart, risking the ankles of prized engineers. Why should I care about exit strategy? We didn't even have a company coffee maker and yet Song was asking about exit strategy? What-the-heck?
(see garage ladder after repairs and reinforcement in picture to the right)
Why didn't I care about exit strategy? Quite simply, I didn't want to exit! I was building an exciting workplace with great technology, great products, great customers, and great employees. If I worked at a place like that, then why would I want to exit?
Furthermore, I actually didn't want to focus on a specific outcome. I wanted to focus on the company itself. I thought success simply comes to those who are trustworthy, hard working, passionate, loyal, outspoken, smart, adaptable, and innovative. Man, I was such an idiot!
Furthermore, I considered my lack of a clearly-identified exit strategy an admirable trait - it showed that I was committed. It showed that I was in it for the long haul. It showed that I wasn't just there to make a fast buck and move on. I remember feeding this idea to investors. They ate it up like Krispy Cremes at a Raiders game.
Reality Fusion was actually the second company that I started with no discernible exit strategy. The first company was an outsourcing business named Cool Software. Damn! Fool myself once, shame on me. Fool myself twice, well, shame on me... again. OUCH!
However, through the miracle of hindsight, the blessing of capitalism, and the curse of future college tuitions, I have come to see the error in my ways. I also see how the forces around me conspired to keep me distracted from the importance of a sound exit strategy.
My mistake was rooted in the subtle but important differences between Building-a-Great-Company vs. Actually-Succeeding.
Business as an Abstract Art-form / Layoff Rants
Creating the business was an artistic endeavor. It was a perfect application of my creative talents. It was a more lasting goal than simply selling out ASAP. As such, the company became a work of art. There was an inner beauty to Reality Fusion that could be seen in our innovative technology, and by the passion of our "core team".
We had powerful building blocks that could be used to create amazing next-generation video applications. We had versatility. We could do "anything with video". We had talent. We had the expertise to make real products. We had committed and loyal employees.
(Popova: Two Figures)
It probably sounds hokey, but people loved Reality Fusion. Especially employees. As the founder, it broke my heart to lay people off. They weren't just losing their jobs. They were losing a dream.
Did I ever write about layoffs? Layoffs really, really, really suck. Like clockwork, once a new CEO started, one of his profound revelations would be the urgency of immediate staff reductions. It didn't matter that the previous CEO had just laid off 40% of the staff a few months earlier. New CEO means New Wrath. That's the deal.
Since I hired most of these people myself, I would usually volunteer to do the nasty deed myself. So, there I was. I was talking to a kid who had been working in QA. I told him that we had to lay him off. I gave him the papers and thanked him for a job well done. This process usually took 3 or 4 minutes. Now that the deed was done, it was "door time".
But this kid just sat there. Speechless. An awkward amount of time passed. He tried to figure it out. A sad, deflated kid. He started asking questions - not confrontational questions mind you, but probing questions - about the company. What were we going to do? What was going to happen to the company? What about the other people? He wasn't nearly as sad about losing his job, as he was sad that he would no longer be part of the company.
This was a reaction that I often witnessed just prior to "door time"; shock, paralysis, idealism destroyed, misguided wisps of determination, frustration, tears and sad fare-wells. Sometimes there was anger, but usually it was short lived. People know that lay offs are not negotiable.
All the time I'm thinking; WHAT UTTER BULLSHIT. Why am I doing this?
Anyway, back to that whole artistic thing. We created an amazing company. It was a work of art. Like a work of art, it was uniquely judged in the context of the beholder's mind. Our beholders were investors, other board members, and officers of the company. Each found their own value, by looking at the company in different ways.
As an abstract beautiful thing, Reality Fusion had universal appeal.
Reality conFusion
Inevitably however, when the concrete started to set, detractors surfaced. One investor thought we were a floor wax. Another investor thought we were a desert topping. But when a new CEO took the initiative and decided we were an industrial lubricant - the art started to take form. The unfortunate consequence of the incarnation of any specific form, was that it would be judged wrong by a majority of our investors. Bad CEO! No bonus!
As long as Reality Fusion's mutual vision was undefined - people were free to fall in love with their own unique visions. The board of directors and the management team wanted the company to succeed. Naturally most people's visions were painted with optimistic tones.
We had vehement agreement on two points; (a) the software is great and (b) we are all success-minded optimistic people. Maybe one other thing; (c) collectively, we are smart enough to "figure it out".
Sadly though, we were wrong about that last point. We had some of the biggest brains in Silicon Valley, and yet we weren't able to figure it out. The result was a 9 year dance of ever changing business plans. Kid's Video Games one day, Adult Web Site the next, Enterprise Software the day after that, Hardware Appliances, Plug-in Applications, Screen Savers, Resalable ASP Services, you name it, we did it... well.. for a little while at least.
ADD - Achievement Destruction Disorder
Once I had mountains in the palm of my hand,
And rivers that ran through ev'ry day.
I must have been mad,
I never knew what I had,
Until I threw it all away.
-Bob Dylan
Whenever we finished something, its lack of instant success fed the detractors and gave birth to new doubts in the minds of the supporters. "See, it wasn't an industrial lubricant after-all!" These snap judgments would occur within weeks or days of a product's release - long before we had the attention of most early adopters.
I know that Microsoft is an extreme example, but look at the success that they attained with Microsoft Word. MS Word release 1.0 was a total piece of shit. It was ugly, slow, hard to use, and unreliable. If any venture funded high tech company produced a product like this, their doors would be locked and the keys would be handed over to auctioneers the very next morning.
Microsoft succeeded with MS Word because they had a long term commitment to its success. When things were screwed up, they'd fix them. If someone couldn't do something, they'd find someone else to do it. As it is, I doubt that MS Word is the best word processor out there, but it is certainly the most successful.
This long term commitment isn't overlooked by users. MS Word users are secure in the knowledge that the product will be supported by Microsoft for the long run.
At one point, Reality Fusion had a little business named CameraCafe. CameraCafe was a pay-for video chat service with a very loyal following of 2000 users. These users didn't fit the "dream profile" for any of us. It seemed that many of them didn't own pants. However, truth-be-told, these were loyal users who loved the software. These people were early adopters.
The company failed to add substantial improvements to CameraCafe and never attempted to "cross the chasm" as we should have. CameraCafe was relegated the status of "back-burner business" while we focused on other art projects instead.
The "art factor" was just one of the problems that we faced when we were focused on Building-a-Great-Company.
I brought my own baggage too.
CODE GUY Unleashed
I like to invent things. I come from a long prestigious line of inventors. But unlike my ancestors, I haven't invented anything as significant as the Microwave Oven, the Thermostat Switch, or the Spencer Carbine. I invent software instead. Software is a little squishier than Carbines. With software, it is hard to define where one idea ends and another begins. Furthermore, software changes more rapidly. But that doesn't stop me from inventing cool things.
Here are some fun names for software objects that I invented while working at Reality Fusion:
- MultimediaDemultiplexingStreamReceiver
- SmoothBYTEArray3x3
- AutoSnapshotMatteCompositor
I figured that a super-cool company should have super-cool technology. My team and I created a vast library of amazing software objects that could do all sorts of things. The library was created over time. It was a byproduct of work we had done along various product paths. The pieces were very modular, and nicely reusable.
Unfortunately, my compulsive tendencies towards building stuff and our ability to quickly change courses didn't help us focus on a specific path. We could be a floor wax, a desert topping, an industrial lubricant, or a leave-in conditioner - it didn't matter. We were usually only 6 months away from being almost anything.
I was too eager to prove the company's worth by embarking on the business plan du jour. With hindsight, I believe that too much flexibility, especially by the company's founder, is bad in the long run. Somebody has to take a stand and put their job on the line. I was too busy playing the part of the obsequious servant to take a stand.
I had one feeble moment in the sun though...
SHOOT ME NOW, PLEASE
At one point, I took over as CEO. In fact, I insisted that I become CEO. The board relented. It was a complicated situation. Several CEOs had already failed. We had 3 "heavywe
ights" on the board. I was determined to figure out the secret formula that would make them all happy. I tried, but I couldn't do it. It didn't occur to me to say, "fuck it, I'll just do what I want god damn it!". Again with hindsight - that's exactly what I should have done.
Adding to my difficulties as CEO was the simple fact that 1/2 of the board thought I was unqualified to run the company. I was the tech guy, not the business guy. They might have been right, of course. But one thing was clear; I didn't have a snowball's chance in hell of figuring out the right business plan if they weren't going to support me.
Actually, this really pissed me off. Every CEO that we hired had the unrelenting support of the board. Except me. Every CEO that we hired had a great severance package. Except me. Bffffttt! (naturally slipped out of my mouth just now...) This shouldn't have surprised me. After all, the board's job is to find a CEO to replace the founder, not allow the founder to replace the CEO.
No support from the board makes it hard to make the board happy. No severance package makes it hard to take a stand. (Incidentally, severance packages are where CEOs get their balls from. You won't be afraid to get fired if "fired" means "nice vacation" and time to regroup. I've spent a year regrouping so far, on my own freakin' dime. Hey, do I sound pissed off? Good. You bet I am!)
OKAY, THEN SQUISH ME INSTEAD
For most of the company's history, I wasn't the CEO, I was the CTO. I've come to believe that investors think CTOs are like bugs in bottles. Put them in the bright sun for too long and they dry out. Forget to feed 'em and they "go to sleep". Shake the bottle too often and their legs fall off. Leave the cover off and they flitter away.
Sure enough, there are a lot of bad things which can happen to a bug. Investors know that.
Investors want us to protect us. They want us to focus on technical jobs like digging tunnels, collecting nectar and building hives. At Reality Fusion, the board believed that technical people (myself especially) should stay out of business decisions and simply do what they are told.
I made far more money for the company than the total money made by all five hired-in CEOs. But that didn't matter. I wasn't the CEO. I was the founder - the worst kind of "bug" there is.
One day I was rolling dung-balls during a board meeting, when an investor announced that we were changing course. He and the CEO had discussed it in advance. I asked some questions. The investor was quite perturbed. While I hadn't actually voiced any specific objections to the new plan, my questions were not well-received. The investor refused to answer questions and said that I was "too attached" to our prior product plan. Shit! I had just worked around the clock to finish the prior product plan - of course I was attached. That's how we finished it - BY BEING ATTACHED!
Here I go on another rampage. Total non sequitur - should be a different post... anyway we were working on the aforementioned product plan. It was a huge project. We had from April to September 15th to complete it. As we got closer and closer to September 15th, people started working around the clock. People slept in their offices. Stacks of empty pizza boxes collected downstairs. We were DETERMINED to complete it on time. Our CEO didn't think we could do it. In fact, he told me over and over again that we couldn't do it. I ignored him and pushed through. We delivered it on September 15th. It turned out that the CEO had promised the product to our distribution partner for September 29th. He padded the date by two weeks and never told us. Phhhfffttt!
Anyhow, (calming down), that was a typical scene. "Barry - back in your jar, right now!"!
I can almost understand the jar scenario. Take care of the CTO; keep him focused on the task at hand. That's not such a bad thing. It becomes a bad thing when exit strategy doesn't make it from the minds of the investors to the head of the CTO. If I don't understand the exit strategy, then I am going to make crazy decisions. I don't know if the board ever had an explicit exit strategy. If we did, I never heard about it.
I think that investors are conditioned to treat the CTO and other key developers as assets and keep them out of potential exit strategy discussions until the very last second. If an acquisition wasn't an established exit plan, people are going to react in unpredictable ways. They might be happy, they might be angry; they might feel insecure about their jobs. They might take a "wait and see" attitude. They might wonder if they have to relocate. All these distractions can derail an otherwise productive product team.
When a company gets acquired, the investors and the CEO typically cash out and move on. CTOs and technical folks end up working for the acquiring company. These differing fates further compartmentalize and isolate the technical team.
Of course, you can avoid all this by having the entire company embrace a clearly defined exit strategy in advance. If the company continues to think that distraction is a factor, you could even explicitly agree that technology folks are going to be isolated from acquisition discussions. When it happens, it will be pleasant surprise for all concerned.
I Wouldn't Want to Hire a CEO that Would Actually Take the Job
We hired 5 good men as CEOs of the company. Each was talented. Most were likable. Most were honest. Unfortunately, none of them led the company to success.
My ideal CEO would:
- Decisively figure out a plan - including exit strategy.
- Show it to the board of directors as a "read only" event.
- Secure additional funding from lead investors as a condition of continued employment.
-> No additional funding (i.e. runway) means no CEO.
- Demand that the board support the plan 100%.
-> No hold outs. No doubters. Work through issues up front.
- Use the money, plus the staff to execute the plan.
- Operate without a safety net - no severance agreement.
-> Committed to ride the ship to the bottom.
Unfortunately, I don't believe that you can find a "hired in" CEO that matches these criteria. I think that people of this stature start their own companies - they aren't looking to raise somebody else's baby - especially if meddling biological parents oversee their every move. I guess I could be wrong about that. But I doubt it.
Most CEOs that would enter a situation like this are willing to take direction directly from the board, and seek explicit approval from the board. If the board isn't decisive, the CEO isn't decisive. It is that simple.
You gotta have one person in charge of the company. One person to take decisive action. At Reality Fusion, we never had one person. At Reality Fusion, the board of directors ran the company. Bad idea.
Why would Birds of Different Feathers Flock Together?
You might be wondering how we ended up with a Board of Directors with such diverse opinions.
Since we weren't committed to a particular direction, the team and the technology were like a Rorschach test; you see what you want to see. Investors invested because of their own vision of the company. This vision was not necessarily shared by the rest of the investors.
For the existing investors - they didn't really care about the vision of the new investor - they cared about the terms of their investment.
There was a harsh example of this. One of our rounds of investment came from a guy who was misinformed of the company's product plans. The strategy for the company changed while we were in discussions with the new investor. Our CEO thought about it, and decided it would be best if we didn't clue him in. The investor loved the old vision. The guy thought he was investing in a floor-wax company, but he invested in a toothpaste company instead.
So there you have a few factors that led to Reality Fusion's demise.
Focus on Actual Success
Let's shift gears and look at what might have happened if we focused on Actually-Succeeding instead.
First you'll notice that succeeding implies that you're actually going to do something in particular. Your goal is not to be a great athlete; instead, your goal is to win the high-jump. In high tech, this victory is an exit strategy.
Let's say your exit strategy was to sell a business to Google, Microsoft or IBM. Here are some things that you might do to succeed at this venture:
First, get everyone marching to the same beat. Start with a leader who is willing to emotionally and financially attach to the success of the venture. Look for investors who agree with the strategy. Look for employees who believe in the strategy. Look for technical folks who believe in the strategy, and who wouldn't mind eventually working for Google, Microsoft or IBM.
Next, understand the value proposition. Your product or technology must increase the market share for the acquiring company. If you aren't giving them users, you are giving them the ability to get users. Be clear about that.
Primp. Do things that make you attractive to an acquiring company. Make your user interface match the UI guidelines of the target companies. Join their development programs. Join their partnership programs. Suck up! Publicly praise their accomplishments. Go further - ask them about their values. What would they consider important attributes of a successful application?
Think long and hard about integration. How could you integrate your technology without needing the acquiring company to "engineer" anything? Use APIs from the target companies whenever possible.
Watch out for the "little company gotchas". If you don't run on all the platforms that the acquiring companies consider important, then have a clearly defined porting strategy. If your software is English-only, then build a localization strategy.

Don't build things that an acquiring company might already have. ESPECIALLY, if the potential overlap represents a complicated integration challenge.
Incorporate standards whenever possible. The only time you should avoid a standard, is if your core business is an improvement over the standard.
Create barriers to entry. Facilitate viral adoption. Amplify switching costs.
Define yourself clearly. Do this through explicit actions. Patent your technology. Document your intellectual property. Bottle the secret sauce. Identify the demographics of your end users. Create a road-map for your product.
When your company gets acquired, celebrate! Give everyone a gold medal. If you've done a good job, everyone wins. You won't end up with mopey developers who believe they got screwed, while the investors are chowing down on Crispy PakaPaka at the Wakaya Club in Fiji.
--------
Lotus Footnote
Lotus was an example of a large scale identity crisis.
It was 1986 or so. Lotus had 1200 employees. 100% of revenue was coming from the 1-2-3 code base. The company had 10 to 20 diverse, albeit amazing, projects in development. But, no one was working on Lotus 1-2-3. In fact, when Jim Manzi (CEO) finally decided that the company should resume working on Lotus 1-2-3, the source files could not be found.
What happened? Lotus 1-2-3 was magic. Its success led to a huge influx of brilliant artistic minds. But none of them believed that a product as mundane as a 2 dimensional spreadsheet could be a recipe for long term success. In fact, most of these brilliant minds believed that 1-2-3 was going to fail at any minute. They thought it was a fluke. So, everyone scrambled to create something better than 1-2-3. It was an art studio for a wide array of projects. Instead of being a small company that couldn't make up its mind, it was a big company that couldn't make up its mind. One of the biggest accomplishments at Lotus, during that time, was corporate child care. They were a pioneer in employee benefits. They didn't, however, win the battle for the desktop; 1-2-3 was beaten by Excel, Ami was beaten by MS-WORD, etc.
The company also exhibited signs of ADD - Achievement Destruction Disorder. Lotus Symphony, for example, was considered by most people in the company to be a failure because its sales didn't exceed the sales of 1-2-3. It didn't matter that it was the 4th biggest revenue generator in the industry at the time.
Eventually, out of the chaos, emerged Lotus Notes. Lotus Notes saved Lotus. Lotus Notes, however, wasn't actually developed by Lotus. It wasn't one of those 10 to 20 projects. It was developed by Ray Ozzie's team at Iris Associates.